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Abstract—Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is a key control system utilized in 
electric power systems. AGC uses frequency and tie-line power flow measurements to 
determine the Area Control Error (ACE). ACE is then used by the AGC to adjust power 
generation and maintain an acceptable power system frequency. Attackers might inject false 
frequency and/or tie-line power flow measurements to mislead AGC into falsely adjusting 
power generation, which can harm power system operations. Various data forgery detection 
models are studied in this thesis. First, to make the use of predictive detection models easier 
for users, we propose a method for automated generation of detection threshold for Long-
Short-Term-Memory neural network based detection models. Second, we study the 
performance of various detection models under low-rate false data injection attacks.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is a key control system in the power grid that aims to 
maintain an acceptable power system frequency (i.e. 60 Hz in the U.S.) for each control area. A 
diagram of the AGC system is shown in Fig. 1. AGC periodically calculates the Area Control Error 
(ACE) based on the frequency and tie-line power flow measurements (i.e., the amount of power 
exchange with neighboring control areas). AGC will use the ACE value to automatically adjust 
power generation in order to maintain a stable power system frequency. However, attackers might 
inject false frequency and tie-line power flow measurements to mislead AGC to calculate a false 
ACE value. AGC will then falsely adjust power generation based on the false ACE value. This 




Figure 1: Automatic Generation Control (AGC) System 
 
There exist various models to detect data forgery in AGC. Predictive models use a subset of 
the previous data to predict the next data. The predictions are then compared to the observed data 
in order to identify attacks. Signal processing models can also detect data forgery with great 
accuracy. For example, Fourier transform based attack detection models [1] use rolling averages 
and frequencies to identify if a subset of the data has been manipulated. In section III, we will 
discuss the following data forgery detection models in more detail: long short-term memory 
(LSTM) neural networks, random forest, and Fourier transform. The first two are machine 
learning-based predictive models, and the third is a signal processing model. 
Predictive detection models require a threshold value in order to detect attacks by comparing 
predicted and real data and assessing their difference. The optimal detection threshold depends on 
multiple factors, like standard deviation, dataset size, etc. It is usually manually tuned which takes 
much time. To simplify the process, in this thesis, we develop a method to automatically generate 
a threshold value for the LSTM based models. The details are discussed in section IV. 
When false data is injected suddenly and/or in a high magnitude, models can more easily detect 
the attack. This is because there will be a sharp increase or decrease in the data, which means that 
the absolute difference between predicted data and observed data will be larger than normal, and 
similarly for Fourier transform, the rolling average will sharply increase or decrease more than 
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normal. However, specially crafted low-rate attacks might not be detected by the models, because 
the attacks start out very small and slowly increase. In this thesis, we study low-rate ramp attacks 
and evaluate various detection models’ performance under such attacks. A low-rate ramp attack is 
an attack that slowly changes data values (the rate of change is governed by a ramp parameter) but 
is run over an extended period of time. Sections V and VI provide more details about the basic 
ramp attacks and the low-rate ramp attacks. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
There has been work done on detecting attacks in AGC [1, 3, 4, 5, 6]. However, none of them 
study low-rate attacks as this thesis does. The closest work [2] discusses low-rate ramp attacks 
against predictive filters in phasor measurement units (PMUs). [2] compares a low-rate ramp 
attack to a prolonged sudden increase attack (adds a constant large amount to the real data for a 
variable amount of time). In this thesis, we compare low-rate ramp attacks to a quicker ramp attack 
that uses a comparatively larger parameter and much shorter attack length. [2] uses two moving 
linear regression formulas (two single-feature linear predictive methods) to predict values for 
attack detection. In this thesis, we study machine learning and signal processing models to detect 
attacks. In addition, this thesis also discusses the relationship between threshold values and ramp 
attack detection. Whereas [2] does not use or discuss any threshold values to detect attacks; it 
displays the absolute difference between predictions and real data, called “observation residues” 
in [2].  
 
III. DETECTION MODELS 
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We split up the data forgery detection models into two groups: predictive and signal 
processing. The predictive detection models consist of the following: multi feature LSTM, single 
feature LSTM, multi feature random forest, and single feature random forest. The signal 
processing detection models consist of the following: Fourier transform min based detection and 
Fourier transform sum based detection [1]. 
Single feature LSTM and single feature random forest detection models [1] use the ACE data 
for detection. They only use one input data feature, so they are called single feature models. After 
a model is properly trained, the model predicts the ACE value for the next cycle using the previous 
5 cycles of real ACE data. Similarly, the model will predict the data for every cycle of the 
remaining data. To detect attacks, the model will look at each 8 cycles of observed ACE data as 
well as the predictions for those cycles. The model will calculate the sum of absolute differences 
between the predictions and observed data for the 8 cycles. If the sum of absolute differences is 
larger than the detection threshold, those 8 cycles are marked as potentially attacked. The only 
difference between the LSTM and random forest detection models is the neural network 
architecture. 
Multi feature LSTM and multi feature random forest detection models take in the following 
input data features: ACE, frequency, tie-line power flow, and optionally load and/or load forecast. 
They are capable of utilizing multiple input data, so they are called multi feature models. For this 
thesis, we will focus on using all 5 input data, because that has the best performance. The prediction 
method is very similar to the single feature models. The only change is that multi feature models 
will use the previous 5 cycles of each inputted data to predict the next cycle of each inputted data. 
The detection method is the exact same as the single feature models.  
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Fourier transform sum and Fourier transform min based detection models use the ACE data 
for detection. The models first calculate a rolling average for every 10 cycles. The rolling averages 
are then converted to frequencies with Fast Fourier Transform (fft). For min based detection, we 
store the minimum frequency value for each 10 frequencies. For sum based detection, we store the 
sum of the absolute value for each 10 frequencies. To detect attacks, min based detection compares 
each of the stored minimum frequencies to the detection threshold; if any of the minimum 
frequencies are less than the threshold, the 10 cycles that frequency represents are marked as 
attacked. To detect attacks, sum based detection compares each of the stored sums of frequencies 
to the detection threshold; if any of the sums are larger than the threshold, the 10 cycles that sum 
represents is marked as attacked. 
 
IV. AUTOMATIC THRESHOLD GENERATION FOR LSTM 
The ideal threshold depends on a lot of factors in the LSTM-based detection method. For 
example, we would use a relatively small threshold for a larger dataset; we would use a relatively 
large threshold for a smaller dataset. This is because the LSTM model predictions will become 
more accurate the larger the training data size, and as a result we can use a lower threshold. 
Additionally, the larger the standard deviation in a dataset, the larger our detection threshold 
should be. This is because there will likely be a larger gap between predicted and observed data 
for a larger standard deviation. Thresholds are usually manually tried and determined, which takes 
much time and has high requirements in the user’s technical background.  
To solve this problem, we develop a method to automatically generate a detection threshold. 
The program will start by first training the LSTM model. With the trained model, it then generates 
predictions on the training dataset. Thus, it is predicting values on the same dataset that was used 
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to train the LSTM model. The program will then calculate the absolute difference between the 
predicted and observed data values. For every possible series of 8 clock cycles (8 data values that 
are right next to each other), we calculate the sum of the absolute differences for each of those 8 
cycle series. The reason we used 8 clock cycles is because according to [1], the shortest data 
forgery attack that can still cause damage to the power grid is 10 cycles. Therefore, we would like 
to choose a number of cycles less than 10, in order to detect the attacks before they inflict damage. 
Now the program has a large list of absolute differences for 8 cycle series. In this list, a majority 
of the list will likely be very small values. This is because the predictions on the training dataset 
will be very accurate. However, there will still be values that are relatively larger; this is because 
of LSTM's forget gate and general prediction faults. The forget gate is something that LSTM has 
in its neural network architecture. LSTM’s forget gate will let the LSTM model not learn from 
certain parts of the training dataset. General prediction faults just reference the fact that a predictive 
model will not be 100% accurate. From this list of absolute differences, the program will then 
select a specified percentile as our generated detection threshold. We will refer to this percentile 
as the generation percentile. If we chose 100 as our generation percentile, the program would 
choose the largest value from the list of absolute differences. If we had chosen 0 as our generation 
percentile, the program would choose the smallest value from the list. 
In order to test automatic threshold generation for LSTM, we took the results of multiple 
generation percentiles' performance on random, scale, and ramp attacks for single-feature LSTM. 
For multi-feature LSTM, we took the performances on random, scale, ramp, min, and max attacks. 
A ramp attack is defined in Fig. 3. A random attack adds a random amount, within a specified 
range, to the real data. A scale attack takes the sum of the real data and the real data multiplied by 
a specified scale parameter. Min and max attacks replace the real data with the minimum or 
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maximum value seen in the previous cycles. We then averaged all of collected true and false 
positive detection accuracies for each model. For multi-feature LSTM we also averaged the attack 
localization accuracies. Attack localization is when the model determines which feature the data 
forgery attack originated from, tie-line power flow or frequency. The results are shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Figure 2: Automatic Threshold Generation Results 
SF = single feature, MF = multi feature, TP = true positive, FP = false positive 
 
As shown in Fig. 2, choosing 100 as the generation percentile causes a relatively low true 
positive (a true positive is a case where a true attack is detected as an attack) accuracy for both 
LSTM models. This is because the program will choose the largest potential threshold value. 
However, choosing a generation percentile closer to 99 has quite good performance. We can see 
that both the single feature and multi feature LSTM models have above 96% average true positive 
while still having less than a 5% average false positive (a false positive is a case where a normal 
event is detected as an attack). 
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To perform the tests shown in Fig. 2, we used a 50k cycle subset of a simulated AGC dataset 
containing more than 600k cycles. This 600k cycle AGC dataset is the same as the dataset used 
for other tests performed for this thesis.  
 
V. RAMP ATTACK ANALYSIS 
Ramp attacks require a ramp parameter, λ. Let t0 represent the cycle when an attack starts. Let 
f(t) represent the data as a function of cycles. A ramp attack could be defined as such (Fig. 3): 
 
Figure 3: Ramp Attack Function 
 
Fig. 4 shows the detection accuracies for each detection model on ramp attacks with various ramp 
parameters, λ, and an attack length of 10 cycles. These tests were done on a 100k cycle subset of 
a simulated AGC dataset containing more than 600k cycles. This subset is split into 2 parts by the 
predictive models: training and testing dataset. For the testing results below, the training dataset is 
the first 67% of the data, and the testing dataset is the remaining 33% of the data. The training 
dataset is used to train the predictive model, and the testing dataset is what the detection results 
are based on. The unattacked ACE testing data is shown in Fig. 5. The signal processing models 
provide detection results over the entire data, training and testing datasets. The ramp attacks were 
injected periodically throughout the testing dataset for predictive models, and periodically 





Figure 4: True Positive Detection Accuracies 
Legend Format: model name | threshold 
 
 
Figure 5: Raw ACE Data 
 
Excluding multi feature models, the detection models only use the ACE data to perform any 
attack detection. In single feature predictive models, we assume that predictions are nearly exact 
to the real data. It will be theoretically impossible to detect ramp attacks when the detection 
threshold is greater than the ramp attack parameter multiplied by 8 (threshold > λ⋅8). Other single 
feature predictive models can replace “λ⋅8” with “λ⋅[the number of cycles the model looks at to 
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compare to the threshold]”. In the tested single feature predictive models, they use 8 cycles of data 
to compare to the threshold. For example, let us consider a detection threshold of 0.1 and a ramp 
attack parameter, λ, of 0.01. When the ramp attack first starts, t0, there will be around a 0.01 
difference between the predicted and observed ACE value, because the model will be basing the 
prediction on the previous 5 cycles, which were not attacked. The prediction for the next cycle, t1, 
will be based on the previously attacked cycle as well as 4 not attacked cycles. Due to t0 being 
directly prior to t1, t0 carries a more weight than the 4 not attacked cycles in how the model predicts 
t1. As a result, we can assume that the model will again have around a 0.01 difference between the 
predicted and observed data. Similarly, as the model continues to predict the data, the predictions 
become closer and closer to the attacked data values, because the previous cycles that the model 
looks at to make predictions will also be attacked. Therefore, at the best case, there will be a sum 
of absolute differences of around 0.08 for 8 cycles; however, it is more likely to be less than 0.08. 
This attack will not be detected by the data forgery model, because 0.08 is not greater than our 
suggested detection threshold, 0.1. If predictions were nearly exact to the real data, a solution 
would be to simply make the detection threshold as small as needed. However, predictions are not 
nearly exact to the real data a majority of the time, because ACE data is constantly fluctuating in 
unique patterns; therefore, reducing the threshold will increase false positives and will not be a 
viable solution in most cases. Similarly, the Fourier transform based detection models will also 
struggle to detect ramp attacks when the ramp parameter is lower. This is because Fourier 
transform models detect attacks based on the larger fluctuations in the data, and if the ramp 
parameter is relatively small compared to the detection threshold, the fluctuations in the data will 
not be detected. Multi feature models are a bit more complex, because they are able to utilize load 
and load forecast data to make predictions. However, they are still predictive models and are 
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susceptible to ramp attacks with smaller ramp parameters, in a similar fashion to single feature 
predictive models. 
If we see the results for the predictive models, Fig. 4, we notice that the LSTM models have a 
better performance than the random forest models. This is because LSTM is more suited for data 
forgery detection in AGC. LSTM uses patterns and trends in the training dataset to make 
predictions in the testing dataset. Random forest uses an average of predictions from multiple 
decision trees (bagging) created from the training dataset. Random forest is also not capable of 
extrapolating, whereas LSTM can extrapolate. Extrapolating means to return a prediction value 
outside of the range given in the training dataset. Random forest is also not as good as LSTM in 
predicting versus time; this is because random forests are not as good at predicting on patterns and 
trends. Random forests also do not work that well given multiple features/categories, especially 
when one of the features are more important than the rest. In our case, the ACE data is more 
important than the rest. When a random forest is given multiple features, it will make random 
decisions on which features to exclude at nodes. This can create a prediction bias, and even when 
it is averaged with other trees, the bias will remain. This will make the predictions seem more 
“average” many times. This is also a reason why multi feature random forest will not be as good 
vs time/trends. This is also a reason why single feature random forest appears to perform better 
than multi feature random forest. 
 
VI. LOW-RATE RAMP ATTACK 
The basic idea behind low-rate ramp attacks is to perform a ramp attack, with a very small 
ramp parameter, for an extended period of cycles. The dataset used to test the low-rate ramp attacks 
is the same dataset used in section V. The ACE values of the testing dataset are shown in Fig. 5. 
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The ramp attacks in section V each had attack lengths of 10 cycles and were injected periodically 
throughout the testing dataset for predictive models and periodically throughout the entire dataset 
for the signal processing models. The low-rate ramp attacks will be injected across the entirety of 
the testing dataset only. The results for the raw dataset and all tested low-rate ramp attacks are 
shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Figure 6: Low-rate Ramp Attacks' Detection Results 
 
First, we conducted tests on the raw dataset, not attacked. This will let us know around how 
many false positives we can expect. The raw ACE testing data is shown in Fig. 5. 
The first low-rate ramp attack is defined below (Fig. 7): 
 
Figure 7: First Attack Function 
 
In the first attack function, the ramp parameter, λ, is set to -0.00001. The function is only applied 
to the ACE data. The purpose of the first low-rate ramp attack is to see how each detection model 
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performs against a single feature pattern. A comparison between the raw and first low-rate ramp 
attack ACE testing data is shown below in Fig. 8. 
 
Figure 8: Raw vs Attack 1 ACE Data 
 
As shown in Fig. 6, the first low-rate ramp attack was only detected by multi feature LSTM. 
The rest of the models did not detect the attack because the number of attacks detected are similar 
or lower than the general false positives of the raw data. We assume that multi feature models are 
capable of detecting this attack due to the weight the other features have on predictions. 
The second low-rate ramp attack uses the same function as in attack 1 and defined in Fig. 7. 
However, the function is only applied to the tie-line power flow data. The changes in tie-line power 
flow are reflected in the ACE values by using the following function shown in [1]: 
ACE = (Ptieline - Psch) + B(f - fsch) 
In the function above, “Psch and fsch are the scheduled tie-line power flow and the scheduled 
frequency respectively. Ptielnie and f are measurements. B is the frequency bias factor, which is 
constant for each power system and is estimated annually” [1]. The purpose of the second low-rate 
ramp attack is to see if there will be a change in detection if the attack originates from the tie-line 
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power flow. A comparison between the raw and second low-rate ramp attack ACE testing data is 
shown below in Fig. 9. 
 
Figure 9: Raw vs Attack 2 ACE Data 
 
As shown in Fig. 6, the second low-rate ramp attack was also only detected by multi feature 
LSTM. We assume that multi feature models are capable of detecting this attack due to the weight 
the load and load forecast data have on predictions. We did test the second attack on multi feature 
LSTM without including the load and/or the load forecast data, and the attack was not detected. 
The third low-rate ramp attack uses the normal ramp attack function defined in Fig. 3. The 
ramp parameter, λ, is set to -0.00001. Similar to the first low-rate ramp attack, the function is only 
applied to the ACE data. The purpose of the third low-rate ramp attack is to test the detection 
models performance on a more traditional low-rate ramp attack. A comparison between the raw 




Figure 10: Raw vs Attack 3 ACE Data 
 
As shown in Fig. 6, the third low-rate ramp attack was also only detected by multi feature 
LSTM. We assume that multi feature models are capable of detecting this attack due to the weight 
the other features have on predictions. More specifically, as more cycles pass, the absolute 
difference between the predicted values and real values increases, because the attack is ramping 
the ACE values and not the other features’ values. 
The fourth low-rate ramp attack uses the same function as in attack 3 and defined in Fig. 3. 
However, the function is only applied to the tie-line power flow data. The changes in tie-line power 
flow are reflected in the ACE values with the same method as in attack 2. The purpose of the fourth 
low-rate ramp attack is to see if there will be a change in detection if the attack originates from the 
tie-line power flow. A comparison between the raw and fourth low-rate ramp attack ACE testing 




Figure 11: Raw vs Attack 4 ACE Data 
 
As shown in Fig. 6, the fourth low-rate ramp attack was also only detected by multi feature 
LSTM. However, the attack was only barely detected. We assume that multi feature models are 
capable of detecting this attack due to the weight the load and load forecast data have on 
predictions. More specifically, as more cycles pass the absolute difference between the predicted 
values and real values increases, because the attack is ramping the ACE and tie-line power flow 
values and not the load and load forecast values. However, the weight that the load and load 
forecast have on predictions seems to be much smaller than the other features, because there are a 
relatively smaller number of attacks detected. We did test the fourth attack on multi feature LSTM 
without including the load and/or the load forecast data, and the attack was not detected. 
The fifth low-rate ramp attack is the same as the fourth low-rate ramp attack, except the ramp 
parameter, λ, is set to -0.000001. The purpose of the fifth attack is to check if the attack will be 
detected by any model if the ramp parameter was lowered even further than the fourth low-rate 
ramp attack. A comparison between the raw and fifth low-rate ramp attack ACE testing data is 




Figure 12: Raw vs Attack 5 ACE Data 
 
 
Figure 13: Raw vs Attack 5 ACE Data - Closer Look 
 
As shown in Fig. 6, the fifth low-rate ramp attack was not detected by any data forgery 
detection models. 
As shown in Fig. 6, multi feature LSTM was the only data forgery detection model to detect 
any of the low-rate ramp attacks. This is because the single feature predictive models and the signal 
processing models struggle against attacks with a small ramp parameter as analyzed in section V. 
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Multi feature random forest also struggles to perform well due to the reasons described in section 
V. Multi feature LSTM also has the advantage of having multiple features to utilize for predictions. 
Multi feature predictive models might be capable of detecting these attacks better, if the load 
and load forecast had more weight on the predictions, because those values are not tampered with 
or affected when injecting false data into tie-line power flow or frequency. This means that if they 
had more weight on predictions, the absolute difference between the predicted and observed values 
could be larger, therefore resulting in more detections. However, adding more weight to load and 
load forecast data could also cause predictions to be less accurate, and this would result in more 
false positives as well as true positives. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis proposed a method for automated threshold generation for LSTM models and 
evaluated its performance. Given an appropriate generation percentile, our automated threshold 
generation method is very effective as shown in Fig. 2. We analyzed and showed results of 
traditional ramp attacks in section V. We explored 5 different low-rate ramp attacks and showed 
their results against the data forgery detection models in section VI. We found that well crafted 
low-rate ramp false data injection attacks are able to avoid detection, as shown by the fifth attack 
in section VI and Fig. 6. 
In the future, more work can be done regarding automated threshold generation for detection 
models other than LSTM. This method works well for LSTM, due to LSTM’s forget gate. 
Additionally, a more universal automatic threshold generation method could be explored. 
More exploration could also be done on the detection of low-rate ramp attacks with the use of 
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